2 (Sustainable Coast), in which the court eviscerated the longstanding right of citizens to hold the State accountable to the very same laws it is entrusted to enact and enforce. In so holding, the court explicitly overruled its prior decision in International Business Machines Corp. v. Evans 3 (IBM) and several cases following that decision, which recognized and confirmed that right.
This Article contends the court erred in ruling that sovereign immunity bars suits seeking injunctive relief against the State where it is alleged that the State is engaging in illegal or ultra vires acts. Although the court's decision ostensibly relied on a textualist approach to interpreting the 1991 constitutional amendment, the court misapplied one of the fundamental principles of textualist interpretation. As an approach to constitutional and statutory interpretation, textualism seeks to determine the ordinary meaning of statutory or constitutional text at the time it was enacted. The court's analysis of the 1991 amendment was flawed because it failed to consider the language of the amendment within its proper historical context, as required by established principles of interpretation in Georgia and by modern textualism generally. Specifically, the court improperly disregarded a long line of precedent that provided important evidence of the historical usage of the term "sovereign immunity" in Georgia law. As this Article demonstrates, such historical considerations are highly relevant under the Georgia courts' textualist approach to constitutional interpretation.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the doctrine of sovereign immunity under Georgia law before the Supreme Court's decision in Sustainable Coast. First, Part I.A briefly explores the history of the doctrine's treatment in Georgia's current and previous constitutions. Parts I.B and I.C examine the IBM case and subsequent decisions relying on IBM. Part II begins with a summary of the background of Sustainable Coast, including the holding of the court of appeals in the case. Later, Part II discusses the decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia to review the case and explores the court's analysis in its opinion. Part III begins with an overview of modern textualism 4 Crowder v. Dep't of State Parks, 185 S.E.2d 908, 911 (Ga. 1971). 5 Id.; see also Gilbert v. Richardson, 452 S.E.2d 476, 478 (Ga. 1994) (noting that Georgia adopted "the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity" in 1784). In Gilbert, the court referenced Blackstone's famous refrain on the origins of sovereign immunity in the maxim that "the king can do no wrong." Id. . Snow and Thro note that although Blackstone's influence on the understanding of sovereign immunity in the United States has been highly influential, many scholars have questioned whether his understanding comported with actual English practice at the common law. Id. at 98 n.4, 104-07. 6 Gilbert, 452 S.E.2d at 478; see also Crowder,185 S.E.2d 908, 910 (citing cases). In Gilbert, the court cited, inter alia, Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924), " [f] or an in-depth analysis of the origins of the doctrine of governmental (sovereign) immunity . . . ." 452 S.E.2d at 478 n.1. For further background on the history of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see generally Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963 (Ga. 1975 ) (holding that the 1974 amendment granted sovereign immunity "constitutional status"). This notion of the doctrine's gaining "constitutional status" significantly impacted the court's analysis in Sustainable Coast, as discussed in further detail below.
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Claims and to establish its jurisdiction over certain types of claims against the State.
9
Otherwise, the provision concluded:
Nothing contained herein shall constitute a waiver of the immunity of the State from suit, but such sovereign immunity is expressly reserved except to the extent of any waiver of immunity provided in this Constitution and such waiver or qualification of immunity as is now or may hereafter be provided by act of the General Assembly.
10
Although the 1974 amendment authorized the General Assembly to waive the State's sovereign immunity, the General Assembly did not exercise this power until the 1983 revisions to the State's Constitution. 11 At that time, voters approved an "insurance waiver," whereby the State and its departments and agencies were found to waive their sovereign immunity if they had purchased and were covered by liability insurance. 12 Then, in 1990, voters approved an "extremely significant constitutional amendment" proposed by the General Assembly, which "effected no less than a complete repeal of, and replacement for, the 1983 constitution's [sovereign immunity provision]." 13 This amendment (1991 amendment), found in article I, section 2, paragraph IX of the 1983 Constitution (Paragraph IX), has remained unmodified and is the present constitutional treatment of sovereign immunity in the State.
14 Paragraph IX(a) authorizes the General Assembly to enact a State Tort Claims Act in order to "waive the state's sovereign immunity from suit . . . ." 15 Paragraph IX(d) details when "officers and employees of the state or its departments and agencies may be subject to suit . . . ." 16 Most significantly for the purposes of this Article, Paragraph IX(e) provides:
Except as specifically provided in this Paragraph, sovereign immunity extends to the state and all of its departments and agencies. The sovereign immunity of the state and its departments and agencies can only be waived by an Act of the General Assembly Shortly after the 1991 amendment took effect, the Supreme Court of Georgia was asked in Donaldson v. Department of Transportation 18 to consider the validity of the voter approval of the Amendment, and to determine whether or not the amendment applied retroactively. 19 In the course of analyzing those issues, the Court readily concluded that the 1991 amendment "extend [ed] sovereign immunity to all state departments and agencies, regardless of any insurance." 20 
B. International Business Machines Corp. v. Evans Recognizes a Long Line of Precedent in Georgia Holding that Sovereign Immunity Does Not Apply to Suits Seeking to Enjoin Illegal or Ultra Vires Acts
Throughout the changes to the doctrine of sovereign immunity described above, Georgia courts consistently held that sovereign immunity was no bar to suits in which plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to curtail the alleged illegal or ultra vires acts of government entities. 21 To be sure, the rationales for such holdings have not necessarily been so consistent, although given the significant changes described above, perhaps that is to be expected. Nevertheless, the fundamental principle-that sovereign immunity may not be used as a shield to enable government's illegal or ultra vires acts-prevailed through all of the doctrinal changes. In sum, citizens' right to hold the government accountable for violating the law and to ensure that government power is confined to its proper scope has been a firm and longstanding element of Georgia jurisprudence.
In IBM, the Supreme Court of Georgia recognized and clarified this established precept in Georgia law. The case involved a suit filed by IBM against the Georgia Department of Administrative Services (DOAS) and its commissioner, David Evans, 17 GA. CONST. art. 1, § 2, para. IX(e). 18 414 S.E.2d 638 (Ga. 1992). 19 Id. at 639, 641. In Donaldson, the plaintiff filed suit against the Department of Transportation before the 1991 amendment took effect. Id. at 642. The DOT argued that waiver is a matter of legislative grace and could be revoked by the General Assembly at any time. Id. at 641. Thus, the plaintiff could not rely on the previously authorized waiver by means of insurance coverage, as that method of waiver was no longer authorized under the 1991 amendment. See id. The court rejected the argument that a waiver of sovereign immunity may be withdrawn with respect to plaintiffs who have relied on the waiver and whose cases are pending. Id. Thus, the 1991 amendment applied only prospectively. Id. at 641-42. 20 Id. at 639. 21 in his official capacity. 22 The case arose out of a Request for Proposal that DOAS issued soliciting bids for the installation of a mainframe computer. 23 IBM and other companies submitted proposals seeking the award of the contract. 24 IBM alleged DOAS had wrongfully awarded the bid to another company, Hitachi, arguing that based on DOAS' own rules for awarding bids, the bid should have been given to IBM.
25
IBM sought to enjoin DOAS from awarding the bid to Hitachi.
26 DOAS and the commissioner argued that IBM's suit was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. After a brief summary of the facts of the case, Justice Fletcher, writing for the majority of the court, proclaimed, "DOAS and the commissioner both contend that sovereign immunity protects them from injunctive relief. We disagree. This court has long recognized an exception to sovereign immunity where a party seeks injunctive relief against the state or a public official acting outside the scope of lawful authority."
28
The court went on to explain that earlier cases employed two different mechanisms " [t] o avoid the harsh results sovereign immunity would impose . . . ." 29 In some cases, the court employed "the legal fiction" that the suits were being brought against state officials acting wrongfully, and not against the state itself "even though the purpose of the suit[s was] to control state action through state employees." 30 The other method entailed examining the allegedly wrongful act and finding that sovereign 22 IBM, 453 S.E.2d at 707, overruled by Ga. Dep't of Natural Res. v. Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast, Inc., 755 S.E.2d 184 (Ga. 2014). 23 Id. 24 Id. at 708. 25 Id. The Request for Proposal specified that a points system would be used to evaluate each proposal. Id. Although Hitachi's proposal earned higher points than IBM's, IBM claimed that the officer who issued the Request told IBM that it would be awarded a certain number of points for its proposal. Id. IBM contended that had it been awarded the number of points promised, its bid would have had the highest score. With regard to these mechanisms, however, the court concluded:
The underlying, though often unstated, premise in these cases is that the executive branch of government cannot cloak itself in the mantle of sovereign immunity when an injured party seeks to enjoin an illegal action. However, the use of such legal fictions and circular reasoning has contributed greatly to the confusion that exists regarding the proper application of sovereign immunity. Recognizing a suit for injunctive relief to restrain an illegal act as an exception to sovereign immunity will permit a more logical analysis.
32
Next, the court turned to an analysis of the changes to the sovereign immunity provision of the State's Constitution effected by the 1991 amendment. 33 The court concluded that the amendment did not "negate this long-standing principle of law," but merely altered the manner in which the state waived its sovereign immunity by no longer permitting waiver through the purchase of liability insurance. 34 a competitive bidding process to award its contracts. 40 Therefore, the fundamental purpose of sovereign immunity would be thwarted if the doctrine applied to a suit seeking injunctive relief in an instance such as IBM. Justice Benham, joined by Justice Hunstein, concurred in part of the judgment and dissented in part. He argued that the majority erred by applying the same analysis of the applicability of sovereign immunity to DOAS and its commissioner. 42 Additionally, he disputed the majority's conclusion that the 1991 amendment did not apply to the case at bar. 43 Further, although he believed that DOAS was protected by sovereign immunity under Paragraph IX(e), he argued that the suit against the commissioner should be analyzed under Paragraph IX(d) of the State Constitution.
44
The dissenting justices would have held that the 1991 Amendment did more than merely change the means by which sovereign immunity could be waived; rather, Paragraph IX(e)'s "sweeping" language would give the state, its departments, and agencies immunity "unless it has been waived by the other subparagraphs of the constitutional provision or by an act of the General Assembly." 45 Therefore, under this "clear language . . . DOAS is entitled to dismissal of the action against it on the grounds that sovereign immunity bars such a claim against a department of the state." 46 As for the commissioner, the dissenting justices argued that case law did support the proposition that sovereign immunity did not apply to certain suits for injunctive 40 Id. 41 Id. 42 Id. at 710 (Benham, J., dissenting in part). 43 Id. 44 Id. The majority addressed this contention in a footnote and argued that Paragraph IX(d) was not at issue in this case because it dealt only with official immunity, not sovereign immunity. Id. at 708 n.2 (majority opinion). Official immunity applies when a litigant seeks to hold a state official personally liable, rather than seeking to control the performance of an official's official duties. Id.; see also Cameron v. Lang, 549 S.E.2d 341, 344 (Ga. 2001) ("The doctrine of official immunity, also known as qualified immunity, offers public officers and employees limited protection from suit in their personal capacity."). relief, but that those suits included only those against officers of the state acting outside their lawful authority. 47 Justice Benham argued that these suits are "not against the state, but against an official stripped of his official character," 48 evidently embracing the "legal fiction" rejected by the majority. Thus, he concluded:
I would maintain the separation between department and personnel that our case law has developed and hold that the commissioner does not enjoy sovereign immunity from a suit seeking injunctive relief if it is established that the commissioner acted without lawful authority and beyond the scope of his official power.
49

C. Subsequent Cases Rely on IBM to Permit Suits Seeking Injunctive Relief Against State Entities
In overruling IBM in Sustainable Coast, the Supreme Court of Georgia indicated that it had uncovered four published opinions (in addition to the court of appeals' opinion under review) relying on IBM to permit suits seeking injunctive relief against the state to proceed. 50 One, In re A.V.B., 51 considered an action filed by the Georgia Advocacy Office seeking to have a minor child removed from the custody of the Dougherty County Department of Family and Children Services on the grounds that the Department had acted illegally in its care of the child. 52 The court followed its earlier ruling in IBM and held that "[s]overeign immunity does not protect the state when it acts illegally and a party seeks only injunctive relief." 53 Citing Justice Hunt's concurring opinion in IBM, the court emphasized that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is meant to protect the public purse by shielding the state from suits seeking damages. 54 61 In that case, Southern LNG filed an action for declaratory judgment recognizing it as a "public utility" under Georgia statute. 62 Additionally, it sought a writ of mandamus ordering the Georgia Revenue Commissioner to assess its taxes as a public utility. 63 The trial court dismissed the action on the ground of sovereign immunity. 64 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia determined that it need not consider the issue of whether sovereign immunity barred the claim for declaratory relief, but noted that " [t] his is not to say that declaratory actions against the State are necessarily barred by sovereign immunity." 65 The following section discusses the issues involved in Sustainable Coast and presents the court of appeals' holding in the case: perhaps the most recent-and at this point final-decision of a Georgia court relying on IBM. The remainder of Part II details the somewhat unusual circumstances underlying the Supreme Court's decision to review the case and the ultimate holding of the court. issuing letters of permission (LOPs) for activities that require formal permits pursuant to Georgia's Shore Protection Act (SPA). 66 The SPA regulates the use of Georgia's beaches, dunes, and other coastal features, recognizing the importance of these natural resources to the State's economy. 67 Under the SPA, anyone wishing to engage in construction activities or other alterations of areas within the scope of the SPA is required to obtain a permit from the Shore Protection Committee. 68 The Center argued that the Coastal Resources Division of the DNR was issuing LOPs without the involvement of the Shore Protection Committee. 69 Essentially, the LOPs were granted to advise people or organizations whether a set of proposed activities would fall within the parameters of the SPA and thus require a permit. 70 The Center argued that DNR was without authority to issue the LOPs, and thus was acting illegally and ultra vires. 71 DNR moved to dismiss the Center's petition on the grounds that: (1) there was no justiciable controversy, precluding the claim for declaratory judgment; and, (2) because all of the Center's additional claims were based on the declaratory judgment claim, they must be dismissed, as well. 72 Additionally, because the Center filed its claim for injunctive relief based on a provision of the SPA, and that provision did not contain a waiver of the State's sovereign immunity, the action was also barred on that ground. 73 The superior court agreed and dismissed the action, and the Center appealed.
II. CENTER FOR
74
B. The Court of Appeals Reverses, Relying on IBM to Permit the Center's Claim to Proceed
On appeal, the court of appeals disagreed with the trial court's conclusion that the Center's claim for injunctive relief must be dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity: "Pretermitting whether [the SPA] permits a claim for injunctive relief, the Center is able to bring such a claim without running afoul of sovereign immunity." 75 Even if the Center's claim could not be brought under statutory authority, it could still pursue a common law claim for injunctive relief. Because the Center clearly alleged that DNR was engaging in ultra vires conduct, its suit was entitled to proceed per the holding in IBM. 76 The court cited IBM for the proposition that Georgia courts "have 'long 2015]
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recognized an exception to sovereign immunity where a party seeks injunctive relief against the state or a public official acting outside the scope of lawful authority.'" 77
C. The Supreme Court of Georgia Grants Certiorari to Address a Question Not Raised by Either Party: Whether IBM Should Be Overruled
DNR appealed the court of appeals' ruling. Interestingly, the crux of DNR's Petition for Certiorari centered on the argument that the court of appeals erred in holding that the Center had stated a common law claim for injunctive relief, whereas the Center's petition allegedly sought injunctive relief solely under the SPA.
78 DNR did not contest the court of appeals' reliance on IBM and its progeny, acknowledging that those cases reflected a "well-established exception that claims for common law injunctive relief against the State are not barred by sovereign immunity where the state acts outside the scope of its authority (i.e., ultra vires) . . . ."
79 Nevertheless, when the Supreme Court granted certiorari, it instructed the parties to address the following issue:
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in Division 2 of its opinion when it held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is no bar to injunctive relief at common law against the Petitioners, notwithstanding that the Petitioners are a department of this State, a division of that department, and an officer of that department sued only in his official capacity? Compare IBM v. Evans, 265 Ga. 215, 216 (1)(453 S.E.2d 706)(1995), with id. at 218 (Benham, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
80
D. The Supreme Court Overrules IBM Based on the "Plain Language" of the Georgia Constitution
In the introductory paragraph of its opinion, the Court succinctly answered the first question it posed in its writ of certiorari: "[W]e find that sovereign immunity bars injunctive relief against the State at common law, and therefore, we overrule Intl. Bus The court listed four grounds for its decision to overrule IBM. 82 The first and second are related and address the impact of the 1991 amendment to Georgia's constitution. 83 The court argued that the 1991 amendment granted the General Assembly the exclusive authority to waive sovereign immunity. 84 Further, the constitution does not provide an exception to this exclusive authority. 85 The court's third rationale criticized the IBM court's characterization of the case City of Thomasville v. Shank 86 as recognizing an exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 87 The nature of the holding in Shank is not essential to the thesis of this Article, so it will not be examined further. The court's fourth rationale, however, is central to this Article's contention that the court's analysis ran afoul of its purportedly textualist grounds. The final basis for overruling IBM was the court's argument that IBM wrongly relied on cases predating the 1974 amendment. 88 This contention represents the crux of Sustainable Coast's error: its failure to consider this critical evidence of the historical meaning of sovereign immunity in Georgia.
The court's opinion began by tracing the history of sovereign immunity in the State, noting that once the common law doctrine obtained constitutional status in 1974, the court had held that courts could no longer abrogate or modify the doctrine. 89 The 1974 amendment constitutionalizing sovereign immunity provided that sovereign immunity was "expressly reserved" and pronounced that only the Constitution or the General Assembly could waive it. 90 The Constitution of 1983 altered the status of sovereign immunity in Georgia by permitting the State to waive sovereign immunity 82 Id. at 188. 83 Id. at 188-90. 84 Id. 85 Id. 86 437 S.E.2d 306 (Ga. 1993). 87 Sustainable Coast, 755 S.E.2d at 185-86 (citing Shank, 437 S.E.2d 306 (Ga. 1993)). Shank explained that a "'nuisance exception'" to the doctrine of sovereign immunity allowed citizens to hold municipalities liable for creating or maintaining dangerous nuisances or those that amount to a taking of property. Id. at 190 (quoting Shank, 437 S.E.2d at 306-07). IBM argued that Shank's application of this longstanding exception after the passage of the 1991 Amendment demonstrated that the Amendment did not abrogate previously recognized exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Evans, 453 S.E.2d 706, 709 (1995) (citing Shank, 437 S.E.2d 306). In Sustainable Coast, the court held that Shank's reference to a nuisance "exception" was essentially a misnomer; thus, the IBM court "misconstrued" Shank's holding. Sustainable Coast, 755 S.E.2d at 188-90. In actuality, the court contended, Shank dealt with a proper waiver of sovereign immunity as provided by the eminent domain provision of the Georgia Constitution requiring the government to compensate property owners for takings. Id. The court cited several cases holding that the constitution waives sovereign immunity in inverse condemnation actions in support of its contention that the holding in Shank truly rested on a legitimate waiver. through the purchase of liability insurance coverage for damages claims. 91 Thus, certain acts of State departments and agencies themselves could constitute waivers of sovereign immunity; exclusive waiver authority no longer rested with the General Assembly.
92
In examining the 1991 amendment, the court repeatedly emphasized the "plain and unambiguous text" of the amendment, 93 noting the rule of constitutional interpretation requiring that "'the ordinary signification shall be applied to words'" 94 :
[T]his Court must honor the plain and unambiguous meaning of a constitutional provision. Our duty is to construe and apply the Constitution as it is now written. Where the natural and reasonable meaning of a constitutional provision is clear and capable of a natural and reasonable construction, courts are not authorized either to read into or read out that which would add to or change its meaning. 95 The court concluded that these textualist rules of interpretation 96 revealed that the 1991 Amendment was designed to return exclusive waiver power to the General Assembly. 97 Thus, the court rejected its holding in IBM that the 1991 amendment merely changed the permissible means by which the State could waive its sovereign immunity by eliminating the insurance waiver under the 1983 amendment.
98 Rather-again emphasizing the "plain language" of paragraph IX-the 1991 amendment "explicitly bars suits against the State or its officers and employees sued in their official capacities, until and unless sovereign immunity has been waived by the General Assembly."
99 Moreover-this time referencing the "straightforward text"-the court found that the 1991 amendment does not permit judicially created exceptions such as that of IBM.
100
" [B] ecause the amendment is 'clear and capable of a natural and reasonable construction,' we may not read an exception into the text or interpret the text to provide for an exception where none is present."
101 Thus, the court essentially rejected IBM's characterization of its own holding as "recognizing" an existing exception to the 91 Id. at 189. The Supreme Court of Georgia later interpreted the 1983 constitution to permit waiver via this method by counties, school districts, and municipalities. With respect to constitutional and statutory language, the inquiry into the linguistic community's ordinary understanding of the terms employed includes consideration of the circumstances existing at the time of enactment.
123 Noted textualist scholar John F. Manning has argued that modern textualists "must always ascertain the unstated 'assumptions shared by the speakers and the intended audience.'" 124 Thus, common law understandings-including "exceptions or qualifications" that go unstated in statutory or constitutional text-must be taken into account in the textualist's contextual inquiry.
125 This "historical context" shapes the meaning of constitutional terms and, therefore, must be examined in any textualist interpretation of such terms. Clearly, then, despite the Supreme Court of Georgia's repeated invocations of "plain meaning," a true textualist inquiry is never automatic-there is more to the determination of even "plain meaning" than initially meets the eye. Georgia's statutory and constitutional interpretation jurisprudence typically reflects a decidedly textualist bent. Principles governing the interpretation of constitutional text frequently parallel those relating to statutory interpretation, and the interpretation of both types of text clearly entails similar methods.
127 It is, then, reasonable to imagine that two statutory provisions in Georgia guiding the courts in the construction 123 See Manning, supra note 116, at 2397-98 ("Even without knowing the speaker's actual intent or purpose in making a statement, one can charge the speaker with the minimum intention 'to say what one would ordinarily be understood as saying, given the circumstances in which one said it.'" (quoting Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 249, 268 (Robert George ed., 1996))); Manning, supra note 109, at 76 ("Textualists give precedence to semantic context-evidence that goes to the way a reasonable person would use language under the circumstances."). 124 Manning, supra note 109, at 81 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 441, 445 (1990)). 125 Manning, supra note 109, at 81-82 (emphasis added). 126 "Plain meaning" and "ordinary meaning" are generally used interchangeably by courts and legal scholars. Jellum, supra note 109, at 921 n.23. 127 See, e.g., Stack, supra note 109 (noting that typically statutory and constitutional interpretation principles tend to converge, although arguing that one's approach to statutory and constitutional construction need not be the same given the differing structural issues involved). But see Ga. Dep't of Natural Res. v. Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast, Inc., 755 S.E.2d 184, 191 (Ga. 2014) (applying a differing level of deference to the principle of stare decisis when interpreting the meaning of a constitutional provision than when interpreting a statute because it is more difficult to alter a court's interpretation of constitutional text than that of statutory text). The latter principle should be distinguished from the use of case law as evidence of a term's historical meaning as advocated in this Article. The use of case law as historical context contemplates an analysis of constitutional terms in the first instance and is a part of the determination of ordinary meaning. Courts' usage of terms is evidence of the terms' ordinary meaning at the time the text was enacted. In contrast, stare decisis would urge courts to apply precedent solely on the basis of its status as precedent rather than as any evidence of the term's actual meaning.
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[Vol. 23:1045 of statutes have influenced the courts' constitutional interpretation, as well. First, courts are directed to "look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly, keeping in view at all times the old law, the evil, and the remedy." 128 However, "the ordinary signification shall be applied to all words . . . ."
129 Thus, the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that so long as statutory text "is clear and does not lead to an unreasonable or absurd result, 'it is the sole evidence of the ultimate legislative intent. '" 130 On its face, the Supreme Court of Georgia's analysis in Sustainable Coast appears to employ many of the foregoing interpretive principles. The court's repeated reliance on paragraph IX's "plain and unambiguous text," "plain language," and "straightforward text," 131 along with the following passage quoted in the opinion, all comport with a textualist approach:
[T]his Court must honor the plain and unambiguous meaning of a constitutional provision. Our duty is to construe and apply the Constitution as it is now written. Where the natural and reasonable meaning of a constitutional provision is clear and capable of a natural and reasonable construction, courts are not authorized either to read into or read out that which would add to or change its meaning. 132 This passage, from the 2006 case Blum v. Schrader, echoes Scalia and Garner's "fair reading" method with its references to the "plain and unambiguous" and "natural and reasonable" meaning. The passage's referral to the court's "duty" and the contention that courts "are not authorized" to alter a provision's meaning through interpretation 128 GA. CODE ANN. § 1-3-1(a) (2014). 129 Id. § 1-3-1(b). The provision goes on to provide that technical terms and terms of art should be treated differently. Id.
130 Shorter Coll. v. Baptist Convention of Ga., 614 S.E.2d 37, 40 (Ga. 2005) (quoting Ray v. Barber, 548 S.E.2d 283, 284 (Ga. 2001)). The plain language of text "as evidence of" legislative intent is a position taken by many, but not all, textualists. Scalia and Garner, for instance, note:
Traditional authorities on interpretation, while repeating the mantra that the objective of interpretation is to discern the lawgiver's . . . intent, would add that this intent is to be derived solely from the words of the text. We would have no substantive quarrel with the search for "intent" if that were all that was meant. But describing the interpretive exercise as a search for "intent" inevitably causes readers to think of subjective intent, as opposed to the objective words that the drafters agreed to in their expression of rights and duties. Subjective intent is beside the point. . . . Objective meaning is what we are after, and it enhances clarity to speak that way. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 110, at 30 (footnote omitted). 131 suggest a concern with preserving separation of powers and the democratic nature of constitutional enactments, both of which are significant concerns for textualists generally and for Georgia courts specifically. 133 Moreover, further evoking textualist theory, the Blum court cited the rule that in constitutional interpretation, "'the ordinary signification shall be applied to words.'" 134 The Georgia courts' jurisprudence does not typically fall victim to what Scalia and Garner described as "hyperliteralism." Rather, Georgia's highest court has endorsed Scalia and Garner's admonition that the meaning of text must be determined not in isolation, but in context. Indeed, the court explicitly cited Scalia and Garner's Reading Law in Smith v. Ellis, 135 a case analyzing the exclusive remedy provision of Georgia's Workers' Compensation Act, noting that in construing statutes, "we do not read words in isolation, but rather in context."
136 And, as part of that necessary 133 For a succinct statement on the general concern of textualists for maintaining separation of powers, see SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 110, at xxvii-xxx ("Our basic presumption: legislators enact; judges interpret." (footnotes omitted)) and Jellum, supra note 109, at 920. Georgia courts endorse this principle. E.g., Cavalier Convenience, Inc. v. Sarvis, 699 S.E.2d 104, 108 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) ("The doctrine of separation of powers is an immutable constitutional principle which must be strictly enforced. Under that doctrine, statutory construction belongs to the courts, legislation to the legislature." (quoting Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 658 S.E.2d 603, 608 (Ga. 2008))). This is not to suggest that individuals espousing other interpretation methods are unconcerned with the separation of powers and democracy. Rather, the point is simply that the frequency with which textualists defend their theory based on these issues, in conjunction with the emphasis on plain language, lends credence to the argument that the Supreme Court of Georgia employs textualist principles, given the court's heavy emphasis on the plain text. For a critique of textualists' claim that their approach is superior in terms of preserving the separation of powers, see William N. Eskridge The court utilized the purpose of the statute-given the context of workers' compensation-to interpret the meaning of the phrase "employee of the same employer" in the Act. Id. at 736-37. The plaintiff, Smith, was injured when Ellis accidentally shot him while firing a new rifle. Id. at 733. Both men were employees of a company that built and sold new houses. Id. at 732. At the time of the accident, Smith was at work on a subdivision to which he was assigned; Ellis, though off work that day, had stopped by the site to borrow a tool from Smith. Id. Smith later settled a workers' compensation claim with the employer, but filed a negligence suit against Ellis. Id. at 733. Ellis argued that the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker's Compensation Act barred Smith's suit because Ellis was "an employee of the same employer" at the time of the injury, while Smith argued that the suit was permissible because Ellis acted as a "third-party tort-feasor." Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that "[i]f the phrase were read in isolation, we could say that Ellis was an 'employee of the same employer' as Smith." Id. at 736. The court examined the purpose of workers' compensation and found the purpose is to require employers to compensate employees for injuries related to the employment. Id. Thus, given the context-workers' compensation-the court held that the defendant must have been acting as an employee at the time of the accident to be considered an "employee of the same employer." Id. at 736-37. [Vol. 23:1045 context, the Supreme Court of Georgia routinely takes contextual clues in constitutional and statutory interpretation from historical considerations, examining the development of legal doctrine through legislative changes to relevant texts and through the evolution of the common law. Again, this is consistent with textualism's attention to the historical usage of terms when interpreting texts.
A recent decision by the Supreme Court of Georgia considering a constitutional challenge to the 2008 Georgia Charter Schools Commission Act highlights the significance of historical context in interpreting constitutional phrases. The plaintiffs in the case argued that the Act was unconstitutional because charter schools do not fall under the definition of "special schools" in a constitutional provision authorizing the General Assembly to provide for the creation of special schools. 137 Aside from special schools, Georgia's constitution grants authority to county and local boards of education to oversee public schools. 138 In reaching its conclusion that charter schools do not fall within the definition of special schools, the majority noted that "'[c]onstitutions, like statutes, are properly to be expounded in the light of conditions existing at the time of their adoption.'" 139 Importantly, the majority's analysis of the historical use of the term "special schools" in Georgia's previous constitutions preceded any mention of the rule that words should be interpreted in light of their ordinary meaning. 140 Ultimately, the court explicitly based its conclusion that charter schools are not special schools on "the natural meaning of the 'special schools' phrase and the constitutional history . . . ." 141 Otherwise, regardless of how divorced the conduct was from the workplace, suits brought against coworkers would effectively always be barred. Id.
One might wonder, given textualist criticisms of purposivism, how this case could be used to exemplify textualism. It is thus worth noting that the court's determination of statutory purpose in Smith v. Ellis was consistent with the scope of inquiry advocated by Scalia and Garner-the inquiry did not veer beyond the text of the Act itself, and its statement of the Act's purpose was concrete and precise. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 110, at 56-58 (listing four limitations that distinguish the textualist's purpose inquiry from a purposivist's). Scalia and Garner argue throughout Reading Law that a key drawback of purposivism is that a statute's "purpose" can become easily malleable by addressing purpose at varying levels of generality. Id. at 16-21, 33-39, 56-58. For instance, nearly any statute could be described as having been passed "for the greater good," but this extremely general purpose, Scalia and Garner argue, leaves judges with unduly broad discretion to determine what the statute does and does not cover. Id. Hence arises the authors' prescription that purpose must be divined solely from the text and should be stated in the most concrete and precise possible terms. Id. at 56-58. Finally, purpose-even textually derived purpose-may not be used to override the meaning of plain statutory text. Id. The Supreme Court of Georgia's description of purpose in Smith adhered to these requirements. 137 Further demonstrating that the use of historical context is an uncontroversial element of constitutional interpretation in Georgia is Justice Nahmias's dissent in the case. He strenuously criticized the majority's use of the historical treatment of special schools in Georgia-not because he felt the line of inquiry was improper, but because he disagreed with the majority's historical analysis. 142 In fact, Justice Nahmias conducted his own lengthy 143 historical review of public education in Georgia 144 and of the constitution's treatment of the issue. 145 Overall, however, he agreed that "'[a] provision of the constitution is to be construed in the sense in which it was understood by the framers and the people at the time of its adoption.'" 146 Remarkably, then, both the majority and the dissenting justice engaged in historical analysis as a part of their inquiry into the meaning of the constitutional text. These justices agreed that the historical usage of constitutional terms shapes their "plain" or "ordinary" meaning.
Even in Blum v. Schrader, with its insistence on attention to plain meaning, the court strongly emphasized the context and history of the statutory text. In Blum, the court reviewed several voters' constitutional challenge to a 2006 act of the General Assembly redrawing three state senate districts. 147 The trial court below dismissed the action, and the voters appealed. 148 The appellants argued that when the Georgia Constitution of 1983 (the present Constitution) was adopted, a change in the language of article III, section II, paragraph II from the previous provision removed the discretion of the General Assembly to redraw districts at any time, rather than only if necessary in response to U.S. census data. 149 The earlier provision, of the constitution of 1976, read: "The General Assembly may create, rearrange and change Senatorial Districts as it deems proper. . . . The apportionment of the Senate shall be changed by the General Assembly, if necessary, after each United States decennial census becomes official." 150 With the adoption of the Constitution of 1983, the provision was altered: "The General Assembly shall apportion the Senate and House districts. Such districts shall be apportioned of contiguous territory. The apportionment of the 142 Id. at 784-85, 799-800 (Nahmias, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[t]o understand why that holding is wrong, it is important to understand the historical context of these issues and of the 'special schools' provision in particular-a history that is truncated and twisted by the majority opinion" and that "[g]iven the majority's dependence on constitutional history, it is remarkable how little support the majority identifies for its claims. In truth, the majority's claims are at odds with the actual constitutional history of this State" (footnotes omitted)). 143 Id. at 785 (noting that "[l]aying out this background takes many pages, but it will illuminate the analysis that follows"). 144 Id. at 783-91. 145 Id. at 799-801 (reviewing the constitutional history and criticizing the majority's rendition of it). 146 The appellants first argued that the 1983 constitution limits the General Assembly to reapportioning districts every ten years because of the removal of the provision that the General Assembly "may" reapportion "as it deems proper[,]" indicating that this discretion was to be eliminated. 152 The court disagreed with this contention, essentially finding that the "as it deems proper" language related to the manner and means of reapportionment, not the timing. 153 Alternatively, the appellants contended that even without regard to the earlier provision, the 1983 constitution's provision did not empower the General Assembly with the necessary discretion to redraw districts except with respect to a decennial census. 154 Here, the court invoked the plain meaning rule using the language ultimately cited in Sustainable Coast.
155 Notably, despite the fact that appellants' second argument was limited to the language of the 1983 provision alone, rather than the historical change, the court nevertheless continued to refer to the earlier provision in its analysis of the current one. 156 In fact, the Court noted,
Had the intent been to depart from the 1976 Constitution and limit the General Assembly to only one redistricting after each census, the framers of the 1983 Constitution could have made an express provision to that effect, and they would not have included the first sentence in Art. III, § II, Par. II.
157
Near the conclusion of Blum, the court quoted the 1947 case Thompson v. Talmadge: "The contentions urged by [Appellants] , if sustained would have the effect of isolating a few words from the entire paragraph and giving to them a refined definition without due consideration of the context in which they are used. This, under all the recognized rules of construction, cannot be done. The true meaning of such words can be ascertained in no other way except by a consideration, inter alia, of the subject-matter to which they relate as disclosed by the entire paragraph."
158
The court embraced a variety of contextual indicators-including the provision's history-in reaching its conclusion. Overall, the court's analysis demonstrates a willingness to consider historical indicators of meaning consistent with the textualist approach to interpretation. Earlier interpretations of the prior constitutional provision impact the court's interpretation today, not merely the reverse.
Perhaps most notably, the court has considered previous constitutional language as part of the relevant interpretive context when addressing questions related to the 1991 amendment to Georgia's constitution relating to sovereign immunity. In Gilbert v. Richardson, 159 the Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed a case brought against two county officials and dismissed by the trial court on the grounds of sovereign immunity. 160 Emma and Tommy Gilbert, the appellants and plaintiffs below, argued that the 1991 amendment, which provided for the sovereign immunity of "'the state and all of its departments and agencies,'" did not apply to counties. 161 The court noted that the 1983 constitution prior to the 1991 amendment also extended immunity to the "state or any of its departments or agencies . . . ." 162 In a 1985 case, the court had held that the "virtually identical" language of the 1983 constitution included counties within the ambit of sovereign immunity. 163 Further, the court had held in 1982 that similar language in the 1976 constitution extended sovereign immunity to the counties. 164 The court explained the import of its prior holdings:
With full knowledge of the construction placed upon the similar language of the 1983 amendment, the legislature proposed and the voters of this state ratified the 1991 amendment. Absent any evidence that the legislature intended a different interpretation or to indicate that the electorate did not intend to extend sovereign immunity to counties, we hold the 1991 amendment's extension of sovereign immunity to "the state and its departments and agencies" must also apply to counties. 165 Arguably, the phrase "state or any of its departments or agencies," read in isolation, by no means clearly entails the inclusion of counties. 166 Even reading the phrase in the context of the entire constitutional provision would not necessarily alter that conclusion because nothing in article I, section II, paragraph IX suggests a reading beyond the most obvious one, i.e. that "state or any of its departments or agencies" would include simply that. 167 Moreover, article I, section III, paragraph 1 of the constitution, which addresses eminent domain and immediately follows paragraph IX, provides compensation requirements for takings by "the state or the counties or municipalities of the state" for public purposes. 168 Although the phrase appears in a different section of the same article, at a minimum it demonstrates that paragraph IX could easily have been drafted to refer explicitly to counties. 169 165 Id. (citation omitted). 166 Professor R. Perry Sentell, Jr., who has written extensively on sovereign immunity in Georgia, called the court's initial decision to construe the 1983 Constitution's reference to "departments and agencies" to include counties "strategic magic via one deft maneuver," Sentell, supra note 13, at 409, and later described the inclusion of counties and municipalities as a dramatic move, see id. at 415. When the court was faced with the need to interpret the 1991 amendment using the same language, Professor Sentell noted that "in earlier times a restrictive reading might well have appeared in order, [but] that can no longer be the logical view." Id. A narrow reading after its previous interpretations "would require the analytical dexterity of a judicial contortionist-equal to that which the court originally employed in extending the coverage." Id. 167 See GA. CONST. art. I, § II, para. IX. 168 GA. CONST. art. I, § III, para. I. 169 The Supreme Court of Georgia has held that where "'the legislature uses certain language in one part of . 2000) ). Of course, as noted, the language referenced above appears in two separate sections of the Constitution, albeit within the same article. Nevertheless, the sections' location within the same article and their close proximity to one another lend weight to the application of the rule cited in Berryhill. Another analogous interpretive principle applied by the court is the presumption "that the same meaning attaches to a given word or phrase wherever it occurs in a constitution . . . ." Clarke v. Johnson, 33 S.E.2d 425, 427 (Ga. 1945). Finally, the court has applied the maxims "'expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another) and expressum facit cessare tacitum (if Gilbert's interpretation of paragraph IX appears counterintuitive in relation to the constitutional text alone. This case and the others discussed in this Part underscore the significance of historical context in the Supreme Court of Georgia's interpretation of constitutional provisions. 170 Finally, case law is a recognized and significant indicator of historical context: The constitution is "to be construed in the light of the common law existing at the time of [its] adoption and the definition or meaning of its terms is to be ascertained by reference to the common-law meaning unless a contrary or different intention appears."
171 Overall, the court's interpretation jurisprudence reflects a textualist, yet holistic, approach, in stark contrast to what Scalia and Garner disparage as "hyperliteralism." This typical attentiveness to context makes it all the more astonishing that the court so thoroughly disregarded historical context in Sustainable Coast.
B. Interpreted in Its Proper Historical Context, Georgia's Constitution Does Not Bar Suits Seeking to Enjoin the State's Illegal or Ultra Vires Conduct
The court's error in Sustainable Coast lies in its failure to recognize that the historical definition of sovereign immunity was not only affected by the text of the 1991 amendment; it also affects the meaning of the text. Under a true textualist analysis (as consistently espoused by the Supreme Court of Georgia), the historical context of constitutional text-including previous judicial and legislative understandings of language used-should be used to interpret even unambiguous text. A given text's "plain" or "ordinary" meaning inherently encompasses an analysis of historical usage of the text's terms.
Under this analysis, the court's finding that the plain language of the 1991 amendment grants the General Assembly exclusive authority to waive sovereign immunity is beside the point. The court's decision failed to inquire into the definition of most significant term in the 1991 amendment: "sovereign immunity." The court quickly dismissed pre-and post-1974 case law that shaped the doctrine of sovereign immunity on the basis that the 1974 amendment fundamentally altered the existing meaning some things are expressly mentioned, the inference is stronger that those not mentioned were intended to be excluded)'" in interpreting constitutional provisions. See Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Cox, 710 S.E.2d 773, 798 (Ga. 2011) (quoting Goddard v. City of Albany, 684 S.E.2d 635, 639 (Ga. 2009)). These canons also suggest that the phrase would be interpreted to exclude counties but for the historical understanding of the phrase. 170 Similar principles are applied in statutory interpretation: "The General Assembly is presumed to enact all statutes with full knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with reference to it. The meaning and effect of a statute '[are] to be determined in connection, not only with the common law and the Constitution, but also with reference to other statutes and decisions of the courts.'" Summerlin v. Ga. Pines Cmty. Serv. Bd., 690 S.E. in their individual capacities will be treated as suits against the State if a plaintiff is actually seeking to control state action. 176 This sensible rule, grounded in reality and emphasizing substance over form, has long been a tenet of Georgia jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, one oddity developed in contravention of the otherwise straightforward rule: the "legal fiction" referred to by the court in IBM. Under it, courts held that suits brought to challenge a government entity or official's ultra vires or illegal conduct were not suits against the State, but rather suits against errant officials.
177
The rationale for these holdings was essentially that illegal or ultra vires acts are not acts of the State. 178 Under the rule described above, therefore, suits seeking to enjoin such actions do not seek to control the State's acts and thus are not barred by sovereign immunity. Essentially, as the court noted in IBM, courts had "scrutinized the challenged act and if the act is legal, found sovereign immunity applies; on the other hand, if the act is illegal, then [courts have] held that sovereign immunity is no bar."
179
This analysis is apparent in a concurring opinion in Evans v. Just Open Government: "So long as the state and its officials obey the constitution and law they are immune from liability but neither the state nor its officials can violate the constitution or law and successfully claim immunity." 180 be determined by a consideration of the nature of the case as presented by the whole record, and not, in every case, by a reference to the nominal parties of the record.'" (quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 492 (1887))).
176 Cannon, 192 S.E. at 208; Ramsey, 182 S.E. at 396. 177 See, e.g., Chilivis v. Nat'l Distrib. Co., 238 S.E.2d 431, 433 (Ga. 1977) ("The rule that the State may not be sued without its consent is not applicable to an action where injunction is sought to prevent the commission of an alleged wrongful act by an officer of the State acting under color of office but without lawful authority and beyond the scope of official power."); Undercofler v. Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co., 152 S.E.2d 878, 882 (Ga. 1966) ("It is urged that this is a suit against the state for which no consent has been granted, and is therefore subject to general demurrer. This assertion is not meritorious. The railroad's claim is that the commissioner is acting beyond his authority and contrary to certain provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions. Hence, this is not a suit against the state."); Irwin v. Crawford, 78 S.E.2d 609, 611 (Ga. 1953); Cannon, 192 S.E. at 208 (holding that a suit against a state employee based on unauthorized or illegal acts "would not be an action against the state"); Ramsey, 182 S.E. at 396; Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 120 S.E. 120, 122 (Ga. 1923) . 178 See Duffee v. Jones, 68 S.E.2d 699, 704 (Ga. 1952) (holding that where a county "through its members, acts beyond the scope of its lawful jurisdiction and commits an actionable wrong, the act so committed is not 'county action,' and in such a case a suit may be maintained in the courts of this State against the wrongdoers").
179 Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Evans, 453 S.E.2d 706, 708 (Ga. 1995). In IBM, the court presented this premise as an alternative to the legal fiction that suits seeking injunctive relief based on alleged illegal acts are not suits against the state. Id. (noting, after discussing the legal fiction, that "[i]n other instances" courts had focused on the legal versus illegal determination). However, this Part argues that the consideration of the legality of an act was wrapped up with the legal fiction because whether or not the act was legal determined whether the act was an act of the State. 180 Suits seeking injunctive relief were permitted to proceed under this reasoning despite the fact that they clearly were brought with the purpose of controlling State decisions and acts. Cannon v. Montgomery, 181 a 1937 case, provides a stark illustration. There, the plaintiff filed a suit seeking injunctive relief to eject the defendant, an employee of the State's Game and Fish Department, from the plaintiff's property. 182 The plaintiff had obtained the property subject to a lease held by the State. 183 However, the plaintiff contended that the Game and Fish Department breached a condition of the lease requiring it to use the land as a fish hatchery, which terminated the lease. 184 The Department argued that it was propagating some fish on the property and that it had employed the defendant as its agent to act as a caretaker of the leased land.
185 Thus, it was clear from the Department's own argument that the defendant in the case was acting as an employee and representative of the State.
After outlining these facts, the Supreme Court of Georgia began by stating the general rule that the State cannot be sued "without its statutory consent."
186 Moreover:
This general rule cannot be evaded by making an action nominally one against the servants or agents of a state, when the real claim is against the state itself and it is the party vitally interested. Therefore, generally, where a suit is brought against an officer or agency of the state with relation to some matter in which defendant represents the state in action and liability, and the state, while not a party to the record, is the real party against which relief is sought, so that a judgment for plaintiff, although nominally against the named defendant as an individual or entity distinct from the state, will operate to control the action of the state or to subject it to liability, the suit is in effect one against the state.
187
The court's analysis in the quoted passage appears consistent with the basic line of reasoning described above wherein the substance of the suit, rather than the named defendant, governs how the suit is construed. One would imagine under this reasoning that the court would be compelled to determine that the suit was, in reality, against the State, given that the State held the lease at issue, and that the defendant justified his presence on the plaintiff's land on the ground that he was directed to be there by the State Game and Fish Department. In order for the court to grant the 2015]
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relief sought by the plaintiff, it would have to determine that the State's lease was invalid. 188 Nevertheless, the court continued its opinion as follows:
"If, however, the sole relief sought is relief against the state officers, it is maintainable. Such it is if it seeks compensation for a past wrong, recovery of possession of property wrongfully withheld, constituting a present wrong, or an injunction against a threatened wrong such as equity will enjoin." A suit may be maintained against officers or agents personally, because, while claiming to act officially, they have committed or they threaten to commit, wrong or injury to the person or property of plaintiff, either without right and authority or contrary to the statute under which they purport to act. Although a defendant may assert that he acted officially and on behalf of the state, a suit of this class is not a suit against the state, whether it be brought to recover property wrongfully taken or held by defendant on behalf of the state. A suit against a state officer because of his unauthorized and illegal acts, for instance, where he is acting in derogation of the express purpose and intent of the state for which he is purporting to act, as where an officer of the state is authorized and directed by law to acquire and hold lands under a lease for the purposes of maintaining a fish hatchery, his actions in so doing would be the acts of the state; but, where such officer acts contrary to and derogatory thereof, his acts are illegal and unauthorized, and a suit against him to recover damages, for an injunction, or to compel him to obviate the effect of his actions in the premises, would not be an action against the state.
189
Although the court argued that suits such as that in Cannon are actually brought against state officials because the officials merely "claim" to act officially, "purportedly" on behalf of the State, the fiction inherent in that argument is obvious. In Cannon, the State itself plainly acknowledged that the defendant was acting as a caretaker on the State's behalf. This case did not involve an "errant" or rogue state official. From this passage, then, the source of the "legal fiction" identified in IBM is clear. Courts reasoned that the legality or illegality of an act determines whether or not an act is the State's because the use of the basic rule alone-which considers whether the relief sought will operate to control State acts-would not permit suits such as Cannon to proceed. In other words, if the only applicable rule considers the effect on the State of a judgment against a state officer, suits like Cannon would be barred by sovereign immunity, and the State could commit illegal acts through its agents with 190 This only further evidences the true basis for the court's holding: the legality or illegality of the act in question, rather than the impact of the suit on the State.
Compounding the illogic inherent in the "legal fiction" rule that insisted that state officials be sued individually is its confused and inconsistent application. In some cases, courts followed the rule in Cannon and insisted that suits against state officers could not be brought against them in their official capacities. 191 In Ramsey v. Hamilton, 192 a 1935 case, the plaintiff sought to enjoin Georgia's comptroller general and other defendants from enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional act. 193 The 190 Id. at 208-09 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The court appeared to attempt to limit its holding by ruling that the rule quoted could be applied only to the particular subject matter "and affecting the plaintiff and defendant and the property, and not affecting the state or rendering it liable outside of the return of the property involved." Id. at 209. This seems consistent with the decisions of later courts such as IBM holding that the State cannot be held liable for damages under any circumstances absent consent. Otherwise, though, the court's "limitation" here does not seem especially significant given the qualification "outside of the property involved." Interestingly, after all the sovereign immunity analysis, the court ultimately concluded that the trial court erred in granting the injunction sought by the plaintiff in Cannon because injunctive relief is unavailable to eject a defendant from real property. Id. 191 See, e.g., id. at 208 ("A suit may be maintained against officers or agents personally . . . ." (emphasis added)); Ramsey v. Hamilton, 182 S.E. 392, 396 (Ga. 1935).
192 182 S.E. at 392. 193 Id. at 393.
court held that the case was not one involving a defendant "pretending to act within the scope of his employment and authority as a state official," but was "plainly and avowedly against the officers in their official capacity. 194 This was evident, according to the court, because the plaintiffs indicated that the defendant comptroller general was being sued "as comptroller-general of the state of Georgia."
195 Moreover, the suit related to "a matter in which the officers have no personal interest as individuals, but are acting for and on behalf of the state of Georgia." 196 On that ground, the court held that the suit was barred because it was a suit against the State.
197 Nevertheless, the court noted that its holding was not intended to bar suits against state officials as individuals "who, under color of the authority of unconstitutional legislation by the state, are guilty of personal trespasses and wrongs . . . ."
198
The Ramsey court distinguished the case from a prior holding in Dennison Manufacturing Co. v. Wright, 199 in which a plaintiff sued Georgia's comptroller general for allegedly collecting an unconstitutional tax. 200 In Dennison, the plaintiff named the defendant William A. Wright, "who was and is comptroller general of Georgia." 201 The court found that the reference to the defendant's position was merely a descriptive phrase and did not indicate he was being sued in his official capacity rather than as an individual. 202 Further, the court's syllabus indicated that the case is "not one against the defendant in his official capacity and to enforce a liability against the state, but is one against him individually for an act, which, while done in his official capacity, was wholly without lawful authority and beyond the scope of his official power." 203 Ultimately, the court held that the defendant could be held personally liable for the amount of the tax collected if the authorizing statute were found unconstitutional. 204 194 Id. at 396. 195 Id. 196 Id. It is difficult to distinguish this point from the situation described in Cannon, which the court decided only two years after Ramsey. Not only is it unclear that the defendant in Cannon had any "personal interest" in remaining on the plaintiff's land, the State itself contended that the defendant was acting "for and on behalf of" the Department as a caretaker of the leased land. One possibility is that this case demonstrates the substantial and consistent difference in Georgia courts' treatment of suits seeking damages versus those seeking solely equitable relief. Had the suit for damages been permitted to proceed in Ramsey against the official in his official capacity, the State may have been obligated to pay damages under respondeat superior. 197 Id. at 397. 198 Id. at 398. 199 120 S.E. 120 (Ga. 1923). 200 Id. at 123. 201 Id. at 122. 202 Id. 203 Id. at 120 (emphasis added). 204 Id. The court noted that this result, though harsh, was mitigated by the fact that in many instances such as in the case at bar, taxpayers will pay the illegal tax under protest, which should put the comptroller general on notice that the tax may be contested and that if turned over to the state, the comptroller may be personally liable for returning the amount paid. Id. at 124.
injunctive relief against the Commissioner to prevent him from acting without lawful authority. 236 In essence, by the time the 1974 amendment was ratified, Georgia courts routinely permitted suits seeking injunctive relief to proceed where the suits alleged that the State and its agents were engaged in illegal or ultra vires conduct. Furthermore, even though early case law emphasized the distinction in this context between suits brought against state officials as individuals and suits brought against them in their official capacities, later case law had all but abandoned that legal fiction. Rather, the rule that evolved centered on an analysis of whether the acts in question were allegedly 237 illegal or ultra vires. Even where personal liability in these cases was arguably assumed or implied, it was clear that courts grew to recognize that unlike in suits seeking money damages, suits seeking injunctive relief must, as a matter of pure logic, bind the State. 238 Thus, the recurring theme that illegal or ultra vires acts do not constitute "state acts" should be understood to mean that such acts are 236 Id. at 801. 237 One interesting issue, beyond the scope of this Article but worthy of further research, would be consideration of the nature of proof required in order to maintain a case seeking injunctive relief where illegal or ultra vires acts are alleged. Many of the cases, including IBM and the court of appeals opinion in Sustainable Coast, would appear to require only that a plaintiff allege that the State is acting illegally or ultra vires in order to survive the State's motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds. Int'l Bus. On the other hand, the Georgia Court of Appeals has held that sovereign immunity is an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Dep't of Transp. v. Dupree, 570 S.E.2d 1, 5 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) ("Sovereign immunity . . . raises the issue of the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction to try the case . . . ."). Moreover, where a plaintiff seeks to benefit from a waiver of sovereign immunity, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that sovereign immunity has been waived. Coosa Valley Technical Coll. v. West, 682 S.E.2d 187, 190 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). In the case of waiver, though, sovereign immunity will apply unless it has been waived. With suits alleging illegal or ultra vires acts and seeking only injunctive relief, sovereign immunity is not applicable. 238 It could be contended that cases truly involving errant officials could arise where a rogue government employee acts entirely on his or her own and without the direction or approval of anyone else within the relevant state department or agency. These cases arguably could, and should, be brought against such defendants in their individual capacities. However, one would imagine that the State itself-acting, of course, through the individual's supervisors or superiors-learning that its agent was taking such actions, would terminate or otherwise discipline the employee. Where, however, illegal or ultra vires acts are authorized by the highest authorities within a State department or agency and become agency or department-wide practice and procedure, it is, as argued above, illogical to contend that those actions are not really the State's.
